Central bank structure, policy efficiency, and macroeconomic performance: exploring empirical relationships - commentary by K. Alec Chrystal




his paper builds on earlier work by Steve
Cecchetti and his colleagues that looks at the
institutional characteristics of central banks
and the regimes they operate and analyzes their
influence on macroeconomic performance. This is
stimulating work that makes considerable progress
in monetary policy analysis. It is also elegant in the
sense that it makes a great deal of progress with
simple tools logically applied. I have learned a lot
from reading this paper and some earlier related
work by the same authors and their collaborators.
The job of a discussant, of course, is to point
out problems and limitations of the research. I can-
not criticize much of the data on which the study is
based, as it was collected by my former colleagues
at the Bank of England; and I agree with the main
conclusion of the current paper, which is that credi-
bility matters a lot for monetary policy. However, I
shall argue that the way in which credibility is mea-
sured leaves a lot to be desired, and so the main
empirical result in the paper should be treated with
some caution. There is, as usual, plenty of room for
further work on this fascinating issue.
The current paper builds on measures of macro
performance and efficiency derived in a previous
paper (Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause, 2001
[CFK]). As the meaning and measurement of these
terms bears directly on the results obtained in the
current paper, it is worth discussing briefly what
these concepts mean and how they are measured.
“Macroeconomic performance” relates to whether
a preference-weighted average of inflation and out-
put variances has increased or decreased, i.e., in
effect whether the Taylor curve has shifted closer
to the origin. “Efficiency” relates to the extent to
which a performance gain can be attributed to policy
better offsetting demand shocks as opposed to being
a result of reduced variance of supply shocks. 
CFK estimate a two-equation linear aggregate
supply/aggregate demand (AS/AD) model for 23
countries and then use the estimated structure in a
Theil-Tinbergen type policy optimization exercise
to solve for the optimal policy rule. The optimum
is compared with the actual outcome; by comparing
1980s and 1990s results, they derive estimates of the
extent to which the improvements in actual perfor-
mance can be attributed to more efficient policy and
the extent to which they are due to reduced supply
shocks. The conclusion according to the CFK esti-
mates is that nearly all countries in their sample
showed an improvement in performance between
the 1980s and 1990s, and the bulk of this improve-
ment was due to increases in the efficiency of policy
rather than to reductions in supply shocks.
These are interesting and important results. But
as with all empirical work there are some questions
one can ask about implicit assumptions on which
the key results depend. My first question relates to
time periods. The authors have compared two time
periods of equal length, but these represent different
and partial phases of two different business cycles.
Roughly speaking the 1980s cycle is measured
trough to peak while the 1990s cycle is close to
being peak to peak (or at least peak to more then
half way back up). This distinction may not be criti-
cal, but it would surely be desirable when the ulti-
mate historical research on these topics is done to
compare complete cycles in terms of policy impacts.
My second question relates to the spillovers
between countries. Is it really a coincidence that
most countries have improved their macroeconomic
performance at the same time? It could be that
central bankers have all been on the same courses
or attended the same conferences where they have
learned the secrets from their colleagues in other
countries. However, it could also be that successful
stabilization policy in one country makes policy
much easier for neighboring countries. This does
not diminish the achievement of better performance
but it does affect who should get the credit. CFK do
make allowances for external prices in their empiri-
cal models, but there are no other ways in which it
is apparent that a more stable external environment
makes domestic policymaking easier.   
This point is given greater force when one looks
at the countries with the lowest policy inefficiency
loss in the 1990s (as shown in Appendix Table A1 of
Cecchetti and Krause as derived from the estimates
in CFK). Five of the six most efficient central banks
are those of the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, and France, all members of the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) with mutually pegged exchange
rate bands. In the cases of France, the Netherlands,
and Belgium especially, these were pegged in a
narrow fluctuation band and thus they had minimal
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Since they were not free to alter monetary policy
to offset demand shocks, what should we make of
this result? Certainly we could not conclude that it
was the optimal manipulation of the domestic policy
interest rate that delivered the efficient outcome,
since policy rates in these countries were focused
on the exchange rate target rather than domestic
aggregate demand or inflation. 
So how can we claim that policy was efficient
if there was no room for activist policy? Surprisingly,
CFK do not comment on this outcome. It could be
that the optimal policy is indeed to tie the hands of
the authorities, but then it would be hard to argue
that they were being efficient in offsetting demand
shocks when they have no way of doing so. Could
it be instead that a pegged exchange rate regime
has some role in reducing shocks? If so, how can
we explain the improvements in policy outcomes
in those countries that had pegged rates in both the
1980s and the 1990s? An alternative interpretation
for the European Monetary Union (EMU) member
countries is that it was German monetary policy
that improved between the 1980s and 1990s and
by pegging to the Deutsche mark they imported
this policy gain. This of course requires us to alter
the analysis of each country optimizing its policy
in isolation, and it raises the further question of
how policy could be more efficient in the five coun-
tries pegged to the Deutsche mark (mentioned above)
than in Germany itself. 
What is new in the paper presented to this con-
ference (Cecchetti and Krause, 2001) is the bringing
together of the results from CFK with some measures
of institutional differences between central banks.
Three of these measures—independence, account-
ability, and transparency—are taken directly from
indexes constructed by Maxwell Fry et al. (2000)
for the Bank of England study on which this paper
draws. A new measure of credibility is constructed,
and, since this (and the results associated with it) is
the key innovation of the paper, I shall concentrate
on discussing this variable. It turns out that, of the
other factors, transparency is the only one that has
even marginal significance.
The credibility index is based on actual average
inflation in the period 1985:Q1 to 1989:Q4. Credibil-
ity is zero if inflation in this period exceeded 20
percent and it is unity if it was less that 2 percent.
Otherwise, credibility is assigned a number between
0 and 1 depending on where inflation sits in the
range of 2 to 20 percent.
The key results are (i) that, for those 23 coun-
tries studied in CFK, the measure of credibility is
highly correlated (negatively) with macroeconomic
performance and with policy efficiency and (ii) that,
for a larger sample of countries, credibility is the
characteristic that most contributes to lower infla-
tion in the 1995-99 period.
The key issue is whether we think this measure
of credibility is itself credible. I do not. Why, for
example, should the credibility of the U.K. Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) after 1997 be judged by
inflation in the United Kingdom ten years before
the MPC was established and even several years
before inflation targeting was first contemplated?
The answer surely is that it makes no sense at all.
It is no real surprise that macroeconomic per-
formance and this measure of credibility should be
highly correlated because credibility (by this mea-
sure) and performance are both related to the level
of inflation—those countries with high inflation in
the late 1980s will still have had relatively high infla-
tion in the 1990s. Furthermore, the fact that this
“credibility” (as measured by the inflation of the
late 1980s) appears to cause lower inflation in the
late 1990s could simply mean that that inflation is
autocorrelated—high-inflation countries in the late
1980s are still, on average, high-inflation countries
in the late 1990s. Two particular countries stand out
as being clearly misrepresented by this credibility
measure. The first is Indonesia, which is rated as
having high credibility on the basis of its relatively
low inflation in the late 1980s. But could there be
any country with lower credibility after 1997? The
other is Chile, which managed a highly credible
(and creditable) disinflation in the late 1990s yet is
accorded zero credibility on the basis of its high
inflation in the late 1980s.
Another obvious point is that virtually no coun-
try had an inflation-targeting regime in the late
1980s, and yet many did have such regimes by the
late 1990s. How can it make sense to judge the credi-
bility of these new regimes from the outcomes in
some earlier regime?
So how should we measure credibility? I would
suggest that it has to be some measure that can be
taken within the period of operation of a regime
rather than from earlier periods. Also it cannot be
based purely upon economic outcomes because
that fails to identify the separate effects of beliefs
and actions. In an inflation-targeting regime, credi-
bility must surely be measured by the deviations
between expectations of inflation and the stated
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from expectation surveys or from inflation expec-
tations implied by comparisons between nominal
and indexed bonds. Of course these measures are
not available for many countries. But this does not
alter the fact that using actual inflation from some
time ago doesn’t do it. Any measure based upon
inflation outcomes in backward-looking data fails
to identify the separate influences of credibility,
policy actions, shocks, and history.
Any convincing attempt to measure the impact
of credibility must also surely do more than look at
a one-shot cross section of countries. In the paper
under discussion it is just about acceptable to calcu-
late policy efficiency in a first stage and then see if
it correlates with “credibility” later. However, in a
panel study in which credibility within individual
countries was allowed to evolve over time, it would
be important to calculate efficiency conditional
on credibility. Only this way could we potentially
answer the most interesting question relating to
successful monetary policies: To what extent was
the actual policy outcome achieved due to the inter-
est rate changes themselves and to what extent was
it due to the credibility of the authorities? It is no
great surprise to find that in a one-off cross section
the countries that had the best macro performance
(lowest weighted combination of inflation and
output variance) also had the most efficient policy
(closest outcome to the optimum) and the most cred-
ible regimes. However, we cannot say from this work
whether credibility was a by-product of the good
policy outcome or whether credibility helped pro-
duce it.
One argument in defense of the specific measure
of credibility used by Cecchetti and Krause might
be that, because it is measured prior to the years in
which the inflation impact and policy efficiency
are estimated, then it must be credibility that causes
the outcomes and not vice versa. However, this is
not very convincing because most of the leverage
in the regressions reported (in column 1 of Table 2
of Cecchetti and Krause) is achieved by the extreme
classification (in effect a 0,1 dummy variable) of
totally credible and totally incredible countries, and
most who fit these extreme categories would con-
tinue to be in the same class in the late 1990s as
they were in the 1980s. For all of such countries we
cannot say that their better policy outcome was due
to credibility because their credibility was identical
in both decades (according to the measure used in
this study). At best we can only attribute credibility
as the cause of an improved policy outcome where
some increase in credibility has been demonstrated.
And a measurement exercise along these lines has
not been attempted; we only have an index of credi-
bility at one point in time. Credibility surely does
matter, but more work needs to be done to answer
the question: How much?
So why am I persuaded that credibility matters
while being skeptical about the apparently strong
results achieved by Cecchetti and Krause? As I have
stressed, the doubts about the Cecchetti and Krause
results relate to the way they measure credibility.
My belief that credibility must matter comes from
a related perspective on the same issue. Is the macro-
economic performance of the 1990s superior to
that of the 1980s simply because the monetary
authorities learned how to pull the strings of the
monetary puppet show in a more timely and accu-
rate manner than their predecessors? The order of
magnitude of interest elasticities that come out of
most macro models makes it difficult to conclude
that interest rate decisions more accurately offset
demand shocks, and so central bankers just learned
to be better optimal controllers. The Bank of England
model, for example, suggests that a 100-basis-point
change in the official rate today will have a 30-basis-
point effect on output growth after about one year
and a 30-basis-point effect on inflation after about
another year. It is highly implausible that the rela-
tively modest official rate changes we have seen in
the last decade could have been sufficient to control
the aggregate economy if the demand and supply
shocks had been of similar magnitudes to those
experienced in earlier periods.
A much more likely explanation is that, at the
world level, most aggregate demand and supply
shocks are endogenous and influenced by the policy
regime. The greater monetary policy credibility
across the world (but especially in major countries)
has significantly reduced the demand and supply
“shocks” to which monetary authorities have to
react. This has meant that the macro outcome has
been improved even though the policy responses
(in terms of interest rates changes) needed to achieve
this outcome have been relatively modest.
Some might call this the “Greenspan effect.” U.S.
inflation has stayed under control even at a high
level of activity because agents have confidence
that the FOMC, and Chairman Greenspan in particu-
lar, has things under control. Surely this belief is not
based solely on the direct effects of specific policy
rate decisions and the fact that they worked in some
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fulfilling prophesy—if enough people believe that
the Fed will successfully stabilize output and infla-
tion, that will generate the desired outcome on its
own irrespective (almost) of what the Fed actually
does.
Some day the world will find out if there really
is a “Greenspan effect.” I hope that we will not set-
tle this issue for many years yet. Good health, Mr.
Chairman.
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